Why we are headed for a double-dip depression

(9 am. – promoted by ek hornbeck)

  It may be the one-year anniversary of an amazing stock market rally, but economists are sounding rather pessimistic these days.

 A growing expectation of a double-dip recession is evident in a new poll of financial executives…the poll found more than half of financial executives predicting another downturn, and most expecting jobs recovery to lag into 2011.

 The predictions don’t end with just this poll. Nouriel Roubini is also warning of a second leg down, and even more disturbing is this report.

 Even as many Americans still struggle to recover from the country’s worst economic downturn since the Great Depression, another crisis – one that will be even worse than the current one – is looming, according to a new report from a group of leading economists, financiers, and former federal regulators.

 What is important isn’t the warnings themselves, it is the why that matters. The why tells the story, not just of how the crisis happened, but also what we should be doing. In this case, the why also tells us much about our economy and are values.

 From the report:

 The report warns that the country is now immersed in a “doomsday cycle” wherein banks use borrowed money to take massive risks in an attempt to pay big dividends to shareholders and big bonuses to management – and when the risks go wrong, the banks receive taxpayer bailouts from the government.

  “Risk-taking at banks,” the report cautions, “will soon be larger than ever.”

 The report centers on the simple fact that the financial system has not been reformed, and is in fact more concentrated than even before the crisis. It also blasts our political leaders for showing none of the backbone and good sense that is needed at a time like this.

 Despite the scary quotes, the report doesn’t go as far as it probably needs to go. For instance, William Black, the guy who helped clean up the S&L banks in the 90’s, has this opinion on the state of the financial industry.

 PAUL SOLMAN: What would you have us do about the major financial institutions as they currently exist?

WILLIAM BLACK: First, stop them from getting bigger. The 19 largest institutions are what we call systemically dangerous institutions. Many of them are already insolvent on any real market value basis.

PAUL SOLMAN: What do you mean insolvent? I mean, they’re reporting large enough profits, that they can give bonuses to their employees.

WILLIAM BLACK: They were able to get Congress to extort FASB, which is the Accounting Standards Board, to change the rules, so that you no longer have to recognize losses on your bad loans, unless and until you actually sell them.

 

 A country full of broke banks is not a new scenario. It happened as recently as the early 1990’s in Japan.

  Like Japan, we had a credit-induced stock market and real estate bubble. Like Japan, both bubbles burst around the same time. Like Japan, the government decided to stimulate now and reform later.

  The Japanese government used targeted tax cuts and infrastructure spending, with the budget going from positive territory to deeply negative territory, much like we are today. Japan’s central bank responded by cutting interest rates to zero, much like we have today.

 Japan has run up the national debt equal to 200% of GDP – the greatest Keynesian stimulus program in history – all in the name of stimulating the economy back to health. It has failed miserably. Japan’s nominal GDP is about the same as when the stimulus began. Those who advocated the policy blame Japan’s failure on either the stimulus being too small or not being sustained for long enough – that is, the dosage, not the medicine itself, was at fault…

 What ails Japan is a lack of reforms, not stimulus. The prolonged and massive bailout has only allowed a bad situation to continue. As governments around the world look at their own problems, this is the lesson they should draw from Japan – not the wrong one that insists Japan should have spent more.

 Throwing money at a problem that is essentially created by easy money is the wrong solution. The country is suffering from decades of malinvestment created with bad debt. That bad debt needs to be washed out of the system. Losses need to be recognized and written off.

Fighting the last war

 Right from the start of this crisis, our leaders have prescribed the wrong medicine for what ails us. Ben Bernanke and Timothy Geithner have approached this as a crisis of liquidity (i.e the ability to borrow) instead of one of insolvency. Renown economists such as Paul Kruman and James Galbraith have pointed out this fundamental error to no avail.

  What does it mean to make this mistake? A good example of the consequences of this flawed policy are in this mostly overlooked news article.

 Nevada Federal Credit Union has a deal for big savers: Withdraw your money and you’ll get a bonus…

 The financial institution typically uses member deposits, including certificates of deposit and money market accounts, to make loans, which typically bear higher rates than deposits.

 Beal figures those interest-bearing accounts are a money-losing proposition in Nevada’s current depressed economy.

 “We don’t have any loan demand right now,” Beal said.

 Approaching this as a liquidity problem means the prescription is to push down interest rates and making sure that financial institutions can borrow all the money they need from the Federal Reserve. As is evident in the example above, that policy has actually done harm instead of helped.

  The problem isn’t the ability of banks to get money. The problem is finding credit-worthy borrowers. Everyone from Wall Street to Main Street is already overloaded in debt after purchasing overvalued assets. This weird dynamic has broken the traditional banking model that all financial regulation is built upon.

 The old definition of banks, “take demand deposits and make commercial loans,” has been changed in practice to a new one: “borrow money guaranteed by the government and make real estate loans.” The implications of this structural shift for systemic financial risk have yet to be worked out.

 The year long stock market rally has managed to push bank equity values up and give them the appearance of health, but their underlying portfolios are still full of toxic assets that have continued to fall in price. Thus the insolvency of the banks has continued. William Black says that this is all by design.

 The administration and industry do not want the public to know that the financial system brought us to the brink of a Great Depression and that Treasury and the Fed only delayed that catastrophe by adopting policies that (1) increased “moral hazard”, which makes future crises more likely, and (2) combine the worst elements of “crony capitalism” and the “socialized losses.”

  There has been no honest examination of the crisis because it would embarrass C.E.O.s and politicians…

  Instead, the Treasury and the Fed are urging us not to examine the crisis and to believe that all will soon be well. There have been no prosecutions of the chief executives of the large nonprime lenders that would expose the “epidemic” of fraudulent mortgage lending that drove the crisis. There has been no accountability.

The first step toward fixing this mess is creating accountability. The idea that it was a “few bad apples” has been floated, but few have fallen for it. Very quietly, Wall Street has been losing one lawsuit after another from angry investors. Wall Street has paid out $430 Billion in damages to victimized investors in 1,500 different lawsuits. Yet the SEC is unable to bring a single criminal charge against a bank CEO.

  It isn’t just Black who thinks the crisis was caused by fraud. Elizabeth Warren also suspects massive fraud, as does Janet Tavakoli, Congress woman  Marcy Kaptur, economist Max Wolff, and economics professor James K. Galbraith.

 You had fraud in the origination of the mortgages, fraud in the underwriting, fraud in the ratings agencies.

 Instead of doing what is right, both the Bush and Obama Administrations have worked hard to eliminate accountability. If anything, there appears to be an ongoing cover-up that spans both White House administrations and both parties in Congress. The fraud even appears to stretch into the Federal Reserve itself.

  The news media has participated in this sham by covering the crisis in a way that takes all the human elements out of it.

What’s a little fraud between friends?

 As Elizabeth Warren has pointed out repeatedly, few wealthy investors “took a haircut” from their bad investments, few CEO lost his jobs, and no Too-Big-To-Fail bank was broken up. Nothing has changed on Wall Street, except that there are fewer banks where bankers are free to commit fraud.

  Reform is important, but prosecuting the fraud is even more important. The crisis happened because no one was sure of the extent of the fraud, so everyone stopped loaning money to each other, and buying each other’s financial products. There was a crisis of trust. Trust must be restored before the system starts working properly again, and to do that the criminals must be held accountable.

 The public will need to “hold the perpetrators of the economic disaster responsible and take what actions they can to prevent them from harming the economy again.” In addition, the public will have to see proof that government and business leaders can behave responsibly before they will trust them again, he argued.

 There was a three year gap between the 1929 stock market crash and the Pecora Commission, which exposed to the public massive fraud and conflicts of interest that caused the crash. During that three year period the country sank into Depression. The results of the Pecora findings was the Glass-Steagall Banking Act of 1933, the Securities Act of 1933, and the creation of the SEC.

  The economy would never have recovered without these reforms, the reforms would never have happened without the Pecora Commission, and the Pecora Commission would never have been created without a collective decision that people had to be held accountable for the fraud.

 Until the collective outrage of the American citizens overwhelms the politician’s loyalty to their corporate sponsors, and some of these criminals are prosecuted, then we will continue to follow the path of Japan. One year of sluggish growth and high unemployment will follow the next, while the government runs up enormous deficits in the false hope that the next stimulus bill will finally do the trick.

  This is one of the instances where the moral and just thing also happens to be the smart thing to do. The criminals must be exposed and punished. The speculators on Wall Street must recognize their losses. The financial monopolists must be broken up.

 It seems so simple. What lies between us and this logical outcome is a broken political system and a wealthy criminal class.

15 comments

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  1. They’re great but terrifying.  But — though I know why you use it, in that you’re quoting — why the word “risk”?

    Banks and Wall Street aren’t being induced to take “bigger risks”.

    For risk, there has to be some potential value to back up that which you’re producing.

    I’m nothing when it comes to understanding the intricacies of economies but what this looks like to me is not standard capitalist “risk” and more like “ponzi/pyramid schemes”.

    Oh I know they might not qualify with those exact appellations on technical grounds, but that’s what it looks like to these uneducated eyes.  There is no “risk” in that there’s a chance that they might make good on their investment.  Instead there’s extension of bad money after good that 100% cannot help but collapse after a certain iteration.  That’s the fundamental truth not of risk but of a scheme designed to enrich or protect certain people by fraud.

  2. I don’t agree a lick with your analysis, but I think the outcome will be far worse than the massive structural problems Japan had in the 1990s. People are angry, really, really, really angry, and they’re buying the nonsense our mainstream media is delivering.

     There is a non-zero chance that we’re facing Civil War 2.0 and that chance goes up with each day that we don’t address the obvious, massive fraud from Wall Street.

  3. More on the Resolution Authority Headfake  Yves Smith  Naked Capitlism

       The Powers That Be insist that a magic bullet called a special resolution authority will solve many of the problems with the “heads I win, tails you lose” taxpayer backstopped financial system with inadequate oversight. The prospect of taking terminally sick banks out and shooting them will supposedly reintroduce moral hazard and make banks behave responsibly again.

       The problem is that there isn’t much evidence to support this optimistic belief. Investment banks were seen as normal enterprises, at risk of bankruptcy, before the meltdown, yet that did not prevent Bear, Lehman, and Merrill from getting themselves into trouble that ultimately proved fatal. And the leaders of these enterprises did not take meaningful financial hits (oh yes, they were less rich than they would have been otherwise, but none of them is at risk of spending his waning years subsisting on dog food), a lesson surely not lost on other bank CEOs.

       Then we have the wee problem that the idea of a special resolution authority looks not credible. We’ve harped more than once that as long as the firms crucial to debt markets remain deeply connected to each other, the idea that one can be taken out gracefully without impacting the others is a fairy tale. We’ll believe this comforting story only if we see measures to cut back counterparty exposures, most importantly in the repo and credit default swaps markets.

       Bob Teitelman, editor of The Deal, gives a more detailed evisceration of the problems with the idea (I’m jealous that I didn’t write this myself):

              The absence of resolution authority has become as handy an excuse for the mess as any, like the lack of a League of Nations after World War I…..Resolution authority, in short, is the Maltese Falcon of regulatory reform. What is this strange bird? Simply put (though nothing here is simple), it’s the legislative authority to wind down a financial firm. In fact, this definition is about as far as anyone ever gets on the subject….In its grandiose form (as if its normal form isn’t ambitious enough), the mere presence of resolution authority will scare the crap out of stockholders, creditors and counterparties and make them do their job, which is insuring that banks don’t go all suicidal, blow themselves up and force regulators to do their jobs….

               But something about resolution authority feels too good to be true. Resolution authority is modeled after the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.’s power to deal with failing banks. That’s fine, but when was the last time the FDIC tackled a promiscuously interconnected, global, highly leveraged giant? Given that we seem to have no idea how finance is wired, how can we be sure that we can halt contagion from spreading from a firm rotting faster than a day-old corpse?….Resolution authority might even trigger self-fulfilling prophecies — setting off an early scramble for the exits, while regulators are still watching the feature. And what about overseas assets?….

               Who believes that if Goldman, Sachs & Co. was flaming out, the feds would not flinch? Answer: no one with a measurable IQ. Resolution authority resembles proactive bubble defense: The optimal time to use it is before the anticipated corpse turns blue. But if Paulson had shuttered Lehman right after Bear collapsed, would he be praised, pilloried or prosecuted like a dog? Lehman would have howled, Congress would have whined, so try door No. 3. Resolution authority demands, well, resolution in the face of a spitting mob. And yeah, money; no free lunch here. To make it fly requires a hero — Volcker played that role once on inflation — willing to lose everything. Alas, such lunatics are rare, making resolution authority just a dusty prop from an old movie.

       Yves here. Aside from pointing out the obvious, glaring operational issues, Teitelman points out that there is a massive political problem: for resolution authority to prevent contagion, the sick financial firm probably has to be taken out and shot relatively early. Look how quickly Bear went into a death spiral, a mere ten days. Paulson, who was famously aggressive (like it or not, it did take nerve to put Fannie and Freddie into conservatorship) stepped back on Lehman (this seems to have been in part collective frustration of the officialdom team when the Barclays rescue was blocked by the FSA, of having not been prepared for that deal to fail, but it was also clear at the time that Lehman was not going to be rescued, that the bad press on Bear meant the next firm that foundered would not be helped).

    1. Resolution authority would have to be able to quickly untie the Gordian Knot. Cutting might not do. But a start would consist of the authority to seize all assets of the regulated company in whatever country they reside. Kinda hard to do unilaterally.

    2. Second best might be to require the unwinding of all Credit Default Swaps that are NOT written around an insurable interest. We are in the position of a surgeon who knows that surgery might kill the patient, but that the cancer will quickly kill the patient anyway, absent the surgery, complicated by the fear that the patient’s “family” might kill the surgeon if the patient dies in surgery. Just announcing a rule could trigger a stampede, but at least it would end the suspense.

    3. And it might help to make corporate officers liable to the full extent of their personal worth for the costs of the collapse of a financial firm if it can be shown that they failed to exercise a standard of prudence and care. The proposed crime of bank-slaughter comes to mind. At best it might force people to be responsible or risk losing everything.

  4. … the moral and just thing also happens to be the smart thing to do.

    So clear.  So obvious.  But they just seem to refuse to “get” it.

    Wake up or we coincide with non-existence on a massive scale.

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