How We Should Understand the Relative Calm in Iraq

(LC, as good as always!…@10 – promoted by buhdydharma )

One of the saddest things about US political discourse is that both ends of the political spectrum have been afraid of Iraqis actually securing a peace for themselves in their country.  The right has been afraid — correctly — that the current outbreak of peace might merely show the American people that we are not needed there.  But the left has been afraid, too: afraid that calm in Iraq automatically equates to a victory for the Republicans; a technical knock-out for Bush and “the surge”.  But the left only thinks this because the left is convinced of the overpowering ability of the right to shape narrative. 

The truth is that the right-wing in the US doesn’t have a clue why Iraq has entered a period of relative calm.  They want to credit, in some vague way, “the surge”, but at the same time they are wary of doing so, for fear that Democrats will then start saying, “Hey, we succeeded, let’s go home.”

But none of that is correct.  In what follows I discuss the recent calm, the reasons for it, so far as they are understood, and what we on the left should be saying about it.

This essay has four parts.

(Part One) Violence is Down in Iraq.

Recent reports from unembedded, non-mouthpiece journalists in Iraq indicate the violence is significantly down.

(Part Two) The Reasons Violence is Down in Iraq.

An explanation of Muqtada al-Sadr’s reconciliation with the SIIC.  A reminder about the “Anbar Awakening”.

(Part Three) The Problem for the American Right Wing.

Should the Bush Administration take credit for developments they had nothing to do with and probably don’t want anyway?

(Part Four) What Democrats Should be Doing.

Pointing out that peace in Iraq happens, when it happens, however tenuously it happens, despite, not because of, our presence there.

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(Part One) Violence is Down in Iraq.

Iraq has seen a reduction in violence over the past couple of months.  This is evidenced, not by reports from U.S. generals, but by reports from non-mouthpiece journalists in Iraq.  On Oct. 7 Leila Fadel, Baghdad bureau chief for McClatchy news service, filed a genuinely remarkable report about a journey of hers, by car, from Baghdad to the Jordanian border, to begin a month’s leave.  She was the first unembedded reporter to attempt the trip in years. 

Fadel wrote:

Not once in the seven hours that it took to travel the 360 miles or so was there a threatening moment. The concrete barriers that used to block traffic along the road at al Haswa and then later at al Rutba – so insurgents and bandits could assault cars more easily – had been shoved into the median. Traffic flowed quickly and smoothly.

Jay Price and Qasim Zein, also with McClatchy, reported on Oct. 16 that at Iraq’s largest cemetary, business has been slow for the gravediggers.  In a piece predictably and necessarily misconstrued by the American right (a point I’ll return to) Price and Zein wrote:

A drop in violence around Iraq has cut burials in the huge Wadi al Salam cemetery here by at least one-third in the past six months, and that’s cut the pay of thousands of workers who make their living digging graves, washing corpses or selling burial shrouds.

Few people have a better sense of the death rate in Iraq.

“I always think of the increasing and decreasing of the dead,” said Sameer Shaaban, 23, one of more than 100 workers who specialize in ceremonially washing the corpses. “People want more and more money, and I am one of them, but most of the workers in this field don’t talk frankly, because they wish for more coffins, to earn more and more.”

Dhurgham Majed al Malik, 48, whose family has arranged burial services for generations, said that this spring, private cars and taxis with caskets lashed to their roofs arrived at a rate of 6,500 a month. Now it’s 4,000 or less, he said.

And the Thomas E. Ricks and Karen DeYoung at Washington Post report that car bombings are down:

There is widespread agreement that AQI has suffered major blows over the past three months. Among the indicators cited is a sharp drop in suicide bombings, the group’s signature attack, from more than 60 in January to around 30 a month since July. Captures and interrogations of AQI leaders over the summer had what a senior military intelligence official called a “cascade effect,” leading to other killings and captures. The flow of foreign fighters through Syria into Iraq has also diminished, although officials are unsure of the reason and are concerned that the broader al-Qaeda network may be diverting new recruits to Afghanistan and elsewhere.

So violence is down in Iraq.

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(Part Two) The Reasons Violence is Down in Iraq.

There are, apparently, three.  First, Muqtada al-Sadr and Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim, the Shiite leaders of the Mahdi Army and the Badr Brigade, respectively, have agreed to stop shooting at each other.  Second, Sunnis in Anbar Province decided last year to stop shooting at the US occupation forces and start shooting at people who, for reasons of expediency, are collectively labeled “al Qaeda in Iraq”.  Third, fewer foreign fighters are pouring across the Syrian border, for reasons which leave US officals stumped.

(Notice anything in the above about the Iraqi Security Forces?  Me neither.  President Bush has forgotten about “as they stand up we will stand down”, causing Administration mouthpieces on the Tee Vee to forget about it, too.)

First, al-Sadr and al-Hakim.  In a recent, amazingly helpful, column in the Asia Times, Sami Moubayed explains why the two Shiite leaders have agreed to stop shooting at each other.  Four reasons:

1) . . . It seemed like tension was snowballing between both parties and would lead to a Shi’ite civil war – a war that Sadr would lose due to Hakim’s alliance with the Iraqi government, the United States, and Iran.

That is probably why Sadr decided to step out of the battle with maximum face-saving in front of his supporters. Rather than engage in war with Hakim – and lose – he now boasts of having taken a “wise decision” to prevent the shedding of Shi’ite blood. Instead of playing the victim, Sadr actually is now playing the victor. He claimed that his decision to reconcile with Hakim was done with one purpose: “Strengthening the nation”.

Despite great differences in outlook (Sadr wants the US out, Hakim wants them to stay for the time being; Sadr wants a unified Iraq, Hakim wants, or wanted, a federalized Iraq) the two leaders share a common fear of the Sunnis, newly funded and backed by the US.  If the Sunnis wipe out al Qaeda in Iraq while Sadr and Hakim are busy fighting each other, Sadr and Hakim get no credit.  Worse, a strengthened Sunni presence could start fighting Shiites and weaken Shiite control of Iraq.

The political ramifications of the above constitute the second reason:

2) If the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) that is headed by Hakim, collapses, then this spells trouble for the Shi’ites at large. Although Sadr has suspended his membership in the all-Shi’ite parliamentary group, withdrawing his 30 deputies, they remain a natural ally for him in a standoff with the Sunnis. The UIA has already suffered from walk-out of the Fadila Party. It ejected from power, they cannot guarantee a thundering victory, as was the case in 2005. If the UIA is out, then both Hakim and Sadr lose as their successors would be either independent, secular, Sunni, or a combination of all three, and would deny the religiously driven Shi’ites the chance to control government as they have done since 2005. The traditional Arab saying stands: “My brother and I stand against my cousin, while my cousin and I stand against the stranger.” In this case, clearly, the Sunnis are strangers to both Hakim and Sadr.

Next, Hakim, who is stronger than Sadr, is further motivated to join with Sadr because of a recent US Senate resolution, approving of Iraqi partition.  This is embarassingly close to Hakim’s own vision, and he can’t be seen to be in agreement with the hated occupiers.  By siding with Sadr, who is adamantly anti-partition, Hakim saves face.

3) SIIC and Badr have been embarrassed by the Biden-Gelb Plan (approved by the US Senate) for partitioning Iraq. It sounds identical to what they have been calling for since 2004; an autonomous 8-province district for the Shi’ites in southern Iraq. The Iraqi Parliament rejected outright the non-binding resolution on October 3. The UIA, headed by Hakim, immediately seconded the rebuttal. This was not enough, however, for Hakim’s opponents (especially among Sunnis) to come out against him, drawing connections between SIIC’s program and that of the Biden-Gelb Plan. . . .

By allying himself to Sadr – a man famed for his opposition to federalism – Hakim shakes off the nasty image given to him by the Biden-Gelb Plan – that of being a puppet for the United States. While many question Hakim’s relationship with Washington, Sadr is above suspicion in the eyes of ordinary Iraqis. An alliance with Sadr at this stage helps polish Hakim’s image, especially on the issue of federalism.

Lastly, Sadr thought Prime Minister al-Maliki would be gone by now.  The US’s bewilderingly staunch, or at least wearily unending, support for the Prime Minister has forced Sadr to recalculate.

4)

Sadr never imagined that US support for Nuri al-Maliki would be this strong and that despite all the security problems Iraq was facing, the White House was refusing to let him go – fearing what alternative would replace him. Sadr expected Maliki to fall within weeks of the Sadrist walk-out. . .

The Mahdi Army has already sent a positive signal to the prime minister by declaring a 6-month truce under which it will refrain from fighting both other militias, Iraqi police, and US troops. Sadr has also personally cracked down on all armed men performing violence in his name. To date, Maliki’s comments on the Sadr-Hakim alliance have been positive and encouraging to the Mahdi Army. He has said that the reconciliation “came at the right time” and showed “a high sense of religious and national responsibility”. He did not single out Hakim to shower with praise, but rather, commended both Shi’ite leaders simultaneously.

Second: The Sunnis in Anbar Province decided last year to stop shooting at US forces and focus their bullets on the other people they want to be rid of, the AQI guys.  President Bush has done his best to take credit for this, but it began before he’d given any thought to it, and in fact his Administration rebuffed inital Sunni overtures and requests for assistance last year. 

The tribal rebellion against al Qaida in Iraq began in September 2006, well before the surge was even contemplated. That’s when tribal leaders, fed up with al Qaida in Iraq’s attacks on moderate Sunnis and its efforts to impose strict Islamic fundamentalism, formed the Anbar Salvation Council to battle the group.

Tribal sheik Fassal Gaoud, a former Anbar governor, told McClatchy Newspapers in June that the tribes previously had asked for U.S. help in attacking the group, but had been rebuffed. By the time U.S. troops began working with the tribes, the battle against al Qaida was well under way. Gaoud, however, was killed in a bombing at the Mansour Melia hotel in central Baghdad in July in the midst of the U.S. surge.

“We did in three months what they couldn’t do in four years,” Ali Hatam Ali al Suleiman, another tribal leader, told McClatchy in June.

The obvious interpretation of this development is to blame is late coming on the presence of US forces.  Sunnis in Anbar had to decide which group they hated least — AQI or the US — and to stop shooting at them, so the Sunnis could get rid of at least one of them.  The Sunnis decided to shoot at AQI.  Bush takes credit.  But he’s taking credit for a decision that his continued occupation quite obviously merely postponed.  If the Sunnis in Anbar had not had two targets, they would have focussed on AQI sooner.

The slowing of foreign fighters across the Syrian border seems not to be understood.  But it is worth pointing out that Abdul-Aziz Bin Abdullah al-Sheikh, the Mufti (expounder of Islamic law) of Saudi Arabia, recently issued a fatwah for young Saudis to stop fighting in other people’s wars.

RIYADH, Oct 2: Saudi Grand Mufti Sheikh Abdulaziz bin Abdullah Al-Sheikh has warned the Saudi youths against travelling abroad to take part in Jihad since ‘the situation there is troubled, ambiguous and not clear’. He was apparently pointing to increasing number of Saudis reportedly going to Iraq to participate in Jihad.

It’s also worth wondering whether, with oil at record high prices and looking to go higher, the Saudis are getting nervous that they’ve rather overdone it in terms of generating profitable tensions in the Middle East.

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(Part Three) The Problem for the American Right Wing.

The problem for the American right is two-fold.  First, none of the above has much of anything to do with the US, except that the US seems to have acted as a hinderance to a lot of it.  Nonetheless, some spin must be found that makes this all seem to be the work of General Petraeus and President Bush.  But, second, even that’s bad.  Declaring victory, or even celebrating a reduction in violence, is not something right-wing pundits want to be doing.

Even the US military are scratching their heads over whether they’re supposed to take credit for any of this.  In a by-now famous article in the Washington Post, Ricks and DeYoung describe the political and strategic quandry:

Al-Qaeda In Iraq Reported Crippled
Many Officials, However, Warn Of Its Resilience

By Thomas E. Ricks and Karen DeYoung
Washington Post Staff Writers
Monday, October 15, 2007; Page A01

The U.S. military believes it has dealt devastating and perhaps irreversible blows to al-Qaeda in Iraq in recent months, leading some generals to advocate a declaration of victory over the group, which the Bush administration has long described as the most lethal U.S. adversary in Iraq.

But as the White House and its military commanders plan the next phase of the war, other officials have cautioned against taking what they see as a premature step that could create strategic and political difficulties for the United States. Such a declaration could fuel criticism that the Iraq conflict has become a civil war in which U.S. combat forces should not be involved. At the same time, the intelligence community, and some in the military itself, worry about underestimating an enemy that has shown great resilience in the past.

— snip —

Observe how they deal with this article over at FOX:

MORT KONDRACKE, EXECUTIVE EDITOR, ROLL CALL: General Petraeus is not declaring victory over Al Qaeda and, I think, the CENTCOM commander is not either, and there are two good reasons why. First, Al Qaeda might stage some sort of catastrophic spectacular and discredit any claims of victory.

And the second thing is that Congress might say OK, if we have defeated Al Qaeda, let’s pull out. And we do not want to do that because there is still work to be done there, not least of which is the fact that the Iranians are still aiding Shiite militias that we still have to suppress.

They don’t know what’s happening, they’re not sure what to say about it, but they’re sure it’s probably bad, and probably Democrats will do something with it.

CHARLES KRAUTHAMMER, SYNDICATED COLUMNIST: The idea of declaring victory is, I think, really a very bad one given our history with declarations of victory.

HUME: Or even seeming ones.  [Hume gamely comes to Bush’s defense.]

KRAUTHAMMER: Well, the president saying mission accomplished.

HUME: But he didn’t say it. It was on a banner behind him. And, remember, it referred to the Navy and all that. But it seemed to be one.

KRAUTHAMMER [giving up]: It referred to the initial stage of the war, which we assumed at the time was the end of the war, which was deposing Saddam. That was a mission accomplished. But the problem was a second mission arose afterwards, and it was this insurgency.

Krauthammer tries to say that the article shows that the US can beat al Qaeda:

Apart from its influence inside Iraq, it means that Al Qaeda stake a lot on this war, and if they are defeated, it sends a message around the world that the Americans can actually defeat Al Qaeda on foreign territory, difficult to ground, in a sea of opposition, and succeed. And that is an amazing development.

Kristol, trying to be helpful, chimes in that it also shows that the Sunnis in Anbar have sided with us.  A point that would seem to negate Krauthammer’s:

KRISTOL: The other great story, which the administration has not fully exploited, it is that Sunni Arabs turned against Al Qaeda because there were brittle, because they were Taliban-like in their extremism.

But nevermind.  The right is sniffing the new relative calm in Iraq, they don’t like it; they’re afraid it might mean they’ll have to leave Iraq.  They’re trying out different explanations for it; getting pre-emptively hissy with Democrats for exploiting it; they probably just wish it would go away.

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(Part Four) What Democrats Should be Doing.

Democrats should be pointing out that sticking around until Iraqis get sick of shooting at us is not “winning”.  Democrats should be pointing out that our troops are, at best, observers over there of events that have nothing much to do with them, and over which they have no control.  At worst, our troops are slowing things down by giving Iraqis too many targets to shoot at, thus delaying their decisions to fight their own internal bad guys.  To the extent that we understand what’s going on at all over there, that seems to be what is happening.

Above all, the left must not be afraid to acknowledge when things take a turn for the better in Iraq.  One of the saddest things about US political discourse is that both ends of the political spectrum have been afraid of Iraqis actually securing a peace for themselves in their country.  The right has been afraid — correctly — that this merely shows we are not needed there.  But the left has been afraid, too: afraid that calm in Iraq automatically means a victory for the Republicans.  But the left only thinks this because the left is convinced of the overpowering ability of the right to shape narrative. 

The truth is that the right-wing in the US doesn’t have a clue why Iraq has entered a period of relative calm.  They want to credit, in some vague way, “the surge”, but at the same time they are wary of doing so, for fear that Democrats will then start saying, “Hey, we succeeded, let’s go home.”

But that’s all wrong.  It’s not that “the surge” and General Petraeus succeeded; it’s that the US was not doing any good in the first place.  Properly understood, the outbreak of calm in Iraq shows that the reasons local people decide to stop shooting at each other is never going to be fully grasped by, or in the control of, an occupying power — of course not.  Local peace has little to do with whatever it is the occupiers are doing this week, except perhaps to give the local people a common, hated enemy. 

We were slowing the Iraqis down.  We still are.  That has not changed.

(Crossposted at The Big Orange.)