The Big Bribe

Crossposted from The Stars Hollow Gazette

Your trillions in free money at work-

Missouri Becomes Second State To Divert Foreclosure Funds Away From Homeowners To Balance Its Budget

By Travis Waldron posted from ThinkProgress Economy

Feb 13, 2012 at 9:26 am

Last week, Wisconsin Gov. Scott Walker (R) announced that he would use the funds his state received from a $26 billion mortgage settlement between 49 states and the nation’s largest banks to help balance the state’s budget, even though the settlement money was marked to help homeowners. In all, Walker will use $25.6 million of the $31.6 million Wisconsin’s state government receives to help close a budget shortfall.

Though Walker’s move to push struggling homeowners aside may seem radical, it is now being followed by at least one other state. Missouri Gov. Jay Nixon (D) and Attorney General Chris Koster (D) have pledged to put $40 million of the state’s $196 million share of the settlement into the state’s general fund to boost its higher education budget…

60 pieces of silver.

California’s size lands state big share of foreclosure settlement

By Alejandro Lazo, Los Angeles Times

February 11, 2012

California walked away with the biggest chunk of this week’s landmark foreclosure settlement partly because of the state’s size but also because of Bank of America’s desire to escape the legacy of its Countrywide problems.

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California’s large share came even though there have been few complaints among state homeowners about the kind of improper robo-signing practices that launched the talks, which quickly morphed into settlement negotiations about errors that occurred throughout the foreclosure process. More than a year ago, evidence began emerging about robo-signing, in which foreclosure documents were signed without being read or with phony names and titles.

“The robo-signing was the hook for the investigation, that was the most outrageous thing that got the whole thing started. But the robo-signing does not amount to the worst things that servicers have done. What caused the ball to pick up steam was all of the other abuses,” said Kurt Eggert, a professor at Chapman University’s law school. “The servicers really needed California in this deal.”

By signing on, California waived a litany of claims it could have brought against the banks, including unfair or deceptive business practices and general consumer protection statutes that applied to wrongdoing in the loan modification and foreclosure process…

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“They are by far the most important mortgage lending state in the country, and as a result are the most important foreclosure state,” said Guy Cecala, publisher of Inside Mortgage Finance. “It is crucial to have them as part of a settlement.

“These banks badly need to get back in the business of processing foreclosures,” Cecala said, “and it is a huge deal if you don’t have the California attorney general breathing down your throat.”

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Wells Fargo spokesman Tom Goyada said the settlement “is not a one-issue agreement. It covers a range of issues and we are happy to have those set aside and put behind us.” Chase declined to comment. Ally and Citibank did not respond to requests for comment.

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If the banks don’t fulfill the $12-billion guarantee, they will have to make cash payments of up to $800 million directly to the state, a provision that is enforceable in California court, instead of federal court in Washington, where the rest of the deal is covered.

The big banks win again

Foreclosure victims get little help in a mortgage-settlement plan that only benefits the banks’ bottom line

By Matt Stoller, Salon

Friday, Feb 10, 2012 10:00 AM Eastern Standard Time

Rather than settling anything, this agreement is simply a continuation of the policy framework of both the Bush and the Obama administrations. So what, exactly, is that framework? It is, as Damon Silvers of the Congressional Oversight Panel, which monitored the bailouts, once put it, to preserve the capital structures of the largest banks. “We can either have a rational resolution to the foreclosure crisis or we can preserve the capital structure of the banks,” said Silvers in October, 2010. “We can’t do both.” Writing down debt that cannot be paid back – the approach Franklin Roosevelt took – is off the table, as it would jeopardize the equity keeping those banks afloat.

This policy framework isn’t obvious, because it isn’t admissible in polite company. Nonetheless, it occasionally gets out.  Back in August 2010, at an “on background” briefing of financial bloggers, Treasury officials admitted that the point of its housing programs were to space out foreclosures so that banks could absorb smaller shocks to their balance sheets.  This is consistent with the president’s own words a few months later.

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At the time, the President was referring to HAMP, the $75 billion program announced in March 2009 as the administration’s signature program to address problems in the housing market. HAMP had been created because Sen. Jeff Merkley of Oregon demanded some remaining bailout money be used to help homeowners, or he would withhold a critical vote on unlocking the authority for the administration to get more TARP money. Larry Summers sent a letter to Merkley offering both a debt write-down plan (“cramdown”) and the dedication of up to $75 billion of money to help homeowners, in return for his vote.  In fact, administration officials had already decided that they would not pursue a debt write-down.

The settlement announced yesterday, whether you believe the $25 billion number (of which only $5 billion is actual cash), is one-third the size of HAMP. As Obama noted nearly two years ago, that’s just not very much gravel.

A more realistic solution to the problem was actually debated within the administration during the transition, in debates revealed by economist Laura Tyson at the Financial Times’ View from the Top Conference in 2011.  She noted that top officials had to decide whether to engage in mass write-downs of debt similar to FDR’s programs in the 1930s by using tools such as judicial modification, or whether to allow millions of foreclosures to go forward. They chose the latter. The current foreclosure epidemic, in other words, is partially a policy choice.

Everything done subsequent to that decision has been designed to mask this essential policy choice. This settlement is simply the latest example. While the headline number on the settlement is $26 billion, the actual cost to the banks and benefit to homeowners could be far lower, depending on how this complicated system of “credits” will be allocated. The banks will in all likelihood be able to charge off activities they had already planned, such as not pursuing deficiency judgments, refinancing and loan modifications. Some of the money may wind up being be paid not by banks, but by investors, such as pension funds.

Moreover, when the banks have reached settlements with law enforcement officials, they generally don’t hold to them.  The Nevada attorney general recently sued Bank of America for violating an agreements the state had made with Countrywide (once the largest mortgage originator in the country, now owned by BOA)  to end various predatory practices. When you issue parking tickets instead of handcuffs for multibillion-dollar crimes, the crime spree continues unabated. And obviously, HAMP, which was originally budgeted at three times the size of this settlement, has been a complete catastrophe.