Tag: Gen. Stanley McChrystal

Nov 27 2009

1 of 4 Afghan Combat Troops Went AWOL or Quit

The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) recently released figures that show 1 out of 4 Afghan combat troops went AWOL or quit in the year ending in September. Desertion rates are so high and retention rates so low that Gen. McChrystal’s plans to build up the Afghan National Army (ANA) to replace American troops for Afghan security will not work, if the trends continue, because the ANA can get barely enough recruits to replace the losses. Making matters even worse, the loss rate is accelerating while the growth of the ANA is slowing. Moreover, A U.S. GAO report showed the ANA has a 19% absenteeism rate, leaving just 26,000 troops available for combat.

To fight this growing problem the DoD changed accounting procedures in September 2008. Formerly, only troops that were trained and assigned to a unit were counted. Now everyone, including green recruits, is included in the overall strength figures.

Oct 17 2009

Senior Army Officer Says Cut Troops in Afghanistan

Lt. Col. Daniel L. Davis wrote that American troops are viewed by Afghanis as occupiers. Increasing troop levels, as proposed by General McChrystal would only increase resistance. He recommended cutting combat forces.

“Many experts in and from Afghanistan warn that our presence over the past eight years has already hardened a meaningful percentage of the population into viewing the United States as an army of occupation which should be opposed and resisted,” writes Davis.

Providing the additional 40,000 troops that Gen. McChrystal has reportedly requested “is almost certain to further exacerbate” that problem, he warns.

Lt. Col. Daniel L. Davis wrote a 63 page report on his own time advising against the strategy proposed by General Stanley McChrystal.  Lt. Col. Davis is highly experienced in Afghanistan after serving as liaison officer between the Central Command and the Combined Forces Command – Afghanistan (CFC-A) in 2005. Moreover, in 2008 & 2009 he commanded a transition team on the border of Iraq and Iran.

Successful counter insurgencies require the support of the population. After 8 years we don’t have that support. Therefore, Lt. Col. Davis proposes a change in strategy to a “Go Deep” strategy.


The “Go Deep” strategy proposed by Davis would establish an 18-month time frame during which the bulk of U.S. and NATO combat forces would be withdrawn from the country. It would leave U.S. Special Forces and their supporting units, and enough conventional forces in Kabul to train Afghan troops and police and provide protection for U.S. personnel.